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NOTES
Civil Rights-State Action is a Requirement for the Application
of Section 1985(3) to First Amendment Rights
For a century after its initial enactment as section 2 of the Ku Klux
Klan Act, 42 U.S.C. section 1985(3)1 was an unpopular and seldomly
used civil rights remedy. However, in 1971 in Griffin v. Breckenridge2
-the United States Supreme Court revitalized section 1985(3) by elimi-
nating state action3 as a necessary element for recovery in suits involving
racial discrimination. By limiting its holding in Griffin -to the type of
private conspiracy being challenged in that particular case, the Court
left two important issues concerning the scope of section 1985(3)
unanswered: first, to what forms of discrimination other than racial dis-
crimination would section 1985(3) apply;4 and second, whether section
5 of the fourteenth amendment empowered Congress to protect four-
teenth-amendment-based rights against private action.5 In Bellamy
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1970). Section 1985(3) states in relevant part:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise
on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving,
either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protec-
tion of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; . . .
in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons en-
gaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of
such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or de-
prived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United
States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery
of damages, occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more
of the conspirators.
2. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
3. Id. at 101. The requirement of state action had been imposed twenty years
earlier in Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951). The effect of requiring state
action was to limit application of section 1985(3) to use in actions that were more easily
established under other civil rights statutes. As a result, prior to Griffin, section
1985(3) was infrequently and unsuccessfully used. Note, Constitutional Law-Section
1985(3) of the Civil Rights Act of 1871-Color of Law Element Eliminated-Griffin v.
Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971), 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 199, 199.
4. 403 U.S. at 102 n.9. One writer suggests that the Court virtually restricted the
holding to cases involving racial discrimination by basing the constitutionality of the
section primarily on thirteenth amendment grounds. Note, Civil Rights: Are Private
Conspiracies Redressable in Federal Courts?, 25 U. Mmzf L. Itv. 780 (1971).
However, because of the quoted language in the text accompanying note 21 infra, and
because the Court also based the constitutionality on Congress' power to protect the right
to travel and specifically stated that it was not implying the absence of any other
constitutional basis, the correctness of this suggestion is unlikely. 403 U.S. at 105-07.
5. The Supreme Court specifically avoided the issue whether Congress has power
under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment to reach private conspiracies. 403 U.S. at
107.
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v. Mason's Stores, Inc.6 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals was
squarely confronted with these questions in determining whether
section 1985(3) would protect a person who was allegedly denied his
first amendment right of freedom of association by a purely private
conspiracy. The Fourth Circuit avoided the first of these questions,
failing to consider whether section 1985(3) would cover the non-racial
discrimination alleged in Bellamy; and, although implying that section 5
authorized Congress to protect fourteenth-amendment-based rights7
from private action,8 the court held that section 1985(3) displayed
congressional intent that state action be required for an action based on
a conspiracy to deprive first amendment rights.9
The suit arose after John Bellamy was fired from his position at
Mason's, allegedly because of -his membership in the Ku Klux Klan.
Bellamy sued his former employer under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. sections
2000e-2 and 1985(3) for violating his right of free association.' 0 The
district court 1 dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim for
which relief could be granted under either statute,'" and Bellamy ap-
pealed. The court of appeals summarily affirmed the district court's
holding as to section 2000e-2' 3 and addressed whether section 1985(3)
protects an individual's first amendment rights from private conspira-
cies. The court held that section 1985(3) was applicable only when
first amendment rights were violated as a result of state action. The
court reasoned that the right of association is a first amendment right
that is only protected from §tate action because of incorporation into the
6. 508 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1974).
7. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
"The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provi-
sions of this article." Id. § 5. The first amendment right of freedom of association is
incorporated into section 1 of the fourteenth amendment. NAACP v. Alabama, 357
U.S. 449 (1958).
8. For the majority's treatment of this issue, see note 42 and text accompanying
notes 40-42 infra. In his concurring opinion, Judge Boreman states that Congress does
not have the power under section 5 to reach private action. 508 F.2d at 508.
9. 508 F.2d at 506-07.
10. Id. at 505.
11. Bellamy v. Mason's Stores, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1025 (E.D. Va. 1973).
12. Id. at 1026, 1029.
13. Section 2000e-2 is the modem statute proscribing employment discrimination
based on race, color, national origin, sex, and religion. Bellamy alleged that the Ku
Klux Klan was a religion "because its meetings were full of 'religious pomp and
ceremony.'" 508 F.2d at 505. However, due to a failure to comply with pleading rules,
this interesting proposition was not properly before the court. Id.
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fourteenth amendment and that the language of section 1985(3) paral-
lels the language of section 1 of the fourteenth amendment which
requires state action;14 therefore, it concluded that although Congress
may have the power to reach a private conspiracy denying first amend-
ment rights, section 1985(3) is not a reflection of that power. 5
To consider the Bellamy decision in the proper perspective, a
detailed examination of Griffin v. Breckenridge and subsequent lower
court decisions is in order. Griffin concerned several black plaintiffs
who were physically assaulted after the passage of their car on a public
road was blocked by white defendants. The rights allegedly violated
included the first amendment rights of freedom of speech, association
and assembly. 16 The first issue the Supreme Court addressed was
whether section 1985(3) applied to private conspiracies. The Court
cited three reasons for answering this issue in the affirmative. First, the
language of section 1985(3) indicated congressional intent to reach
private parties. The Court focused on the words "go in disguise" and
noted that such activity was little associated with official action, yet
commonly connected with private marauders. 7  Second, Congress en-
compassed all types of state action in three companion provisions to
section 1985(3). The three possible forms of state action are: (1)
under color of state law, covered by the present 42 U.S.C. section 1983;
(2) interference with or influence upon state authorities, covered by
another clause of section 1985(3); and (3) a private conspiracy so
massive and effective that it supplants state authorities, covered by
section 3 of the Ku Klux Klan Act. In view of these three provisions,
the Court reasoned that section 1985(3) would be a useless duplication
unless it applied to private action.' 8 Third, the legislative history
indicated that the sponsors of section 1985(3) intended the statute to
cover private acts. The Court noted that speeches of several supporters
of original section 1985(3) stressed the need to reach private action.' 9
After determining that section 1985(3) applied to private conspir-
acies, the Griffin Court considered the requirements for the application
14. Id. at 506-07. For a fuller discussion of this aspect of the court's rationale, see
notes 40-43 and accompanying text infra.
15. 508 F.2d at 508 (Boreman, CJ., concurring).
16. 403 U.S. at 9-91.
17. Id. at 96.
18. Id. at 98-99. "Given the existence of these three provisions, it is almost
impossible to believe that Congress intended, in the dissimilar language of the portion of
§ 1985(3) now before us, simply to duplicate the coverage of one or more of them." Id.
at 99.
19. Id. at 100-01.
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of the statute. The Court first construed section 1985(3) as requiring
some "racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discrimina-
tory animus."20 The Court saw this requisite as necessary to promote
the policy of giving a civil rights statute "'a sweep as broad as [its]
language' ",21 without transforming it into a general federal tort stat-
ute.22 The Court's failure to specify the scope of this criterion raises the
question what type of discrimination other than racial discrimination is
covered by section 1985(3).
The second requirement the Court imposed was the identification
of some "source of congressional power to reach the private conspiracy
alleged by the complaint in [each] case. '28  The Court found section 2
of the thirteenth amendment and the right of interstate travel to be the
sources of congressional power to reach the private conspiracy alleged in
Griffin.24 However, the Court specified that
[i]n identifying these two constitutional sources of congres-
sional power, we do not imply the absence of any other. More
specifically, the allegations of the complaint in this case have not
required consideration of the scope of the power of Congress
under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. By the same token,
since the allegations of -the complaint bring this cause of action
so close to the constitutionally authorized core of the statute,
there has been no occasion here to trace out its constitutionally
permissible periphery.25
The Court's failure to "trace out the constitutionally permissible peri-
phery" of the provision raises the question of the extent of congressional
authority under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment. Not surprising-
ly, lower court opinions since Griffin have grappled confusedly with the
scope of the Griffin criteria.
Most lower court decisions since Griffin have treated the "racial, or
otherwise class-based, animus" as the initial element of a 1985(3)
claim. Therefore, unless this threshold test is met, courts have been
able to side-step the question of the extent of congressional power under
20. Id. at 102. The statutory basis for the Court's construction of section 1985(3)
lies in the statute's language which parallels language of the fourteenth amendment. See
notes 1 and 7 supra for the relevant language. The Court determined that instead of
being merely a reference to the fourteenth amendment, the word "equal" was used to
indicate the need of "class" discrimination. Id. at 102. See Note, 1972 U. ILL. LF.
supra note 3, at 205.
21. 403 U.S. at 97.
22. Id. at 101-02.
23. Id. at 104.
24. Id. at 105.
25. Id. at 107 (footnote omitted).
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section 5. In cases which do not involve state action, some courts have
construed the term "class-based discrimination" very narrowly, thereby
avoiding the issue whether section 5 authorizes Congress to reach
purely private activity.2 6 On the other hand, those courts not faced with
the section 5 issue, either due to the presence of state action in the claim
alleged or due to the court's previous determination that state action is
required, tend to interpret "class" very broadly. 7 In other words, most
courts have avoided answering one question by a limiting construction
of the other issue. As a result, the success of a 1985(3) cause of action
absent state action has remained doubtful. However, two courts have
found a cause of action under section 1985(3) in the absence of both
state action and racial discrimination.
The Eighth Circuit in Action v. Gannon28 held that a private
conspiracy to deprive certain church members of first amendment rights
mainly on the basis of their economic class was covered by seotion
1985(3).29 The Eighth Circuit first found constitutional authority
under section 5 by relying on the sentiments of six Supreme Court
Justices expressed in two concurring opinions in United States v.
Guest.3" Guest concerned the criminal counterpart of section
1985(3). 3' In his concurring opinion in that case, Justice Clark
summed up the opinion of the six Justices very succinctly: "[T]here now
can be no doubt that the specific language of § 5 empowers the
Congress to enact laws punishing all conspiracies-with or without state
action-that interfere with Fourteenth Amendment rights."'32  The
26. Arnold v. Tiffany, 359 F. Supp. 1034, 1036 (C.D. Cal. 1973) (newspaper
dealers trade association-no class); America's Best Cinema Corp. v. Fort Wayne
Newspapers, Inc., 347 F. Supp. 328, 335 (N.D. Ind. 1972) (all theaters showing unrated
adult movies-no class). See Note, Federal Power to Regulate Private Discrimination:
The Revival of the Enforcement Clauses of the Reconstruction Era Amendments, 74
COLUM. L. RPv. 449, 517 (1974).
27. Cameron v. Brock, 473 F.2d 608, 610 (6th Cir. 1973) (suppo)rters of political
candidate); Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190, 193 (7th Cir. 1972) (criminal
lawyers, case dismissed due to absence of state action); Azar v. Conley, 456 F.2d 1382,
1386 n.5 (6th Cir. -1972) (middle class white family).
28. 450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971) (en banc).
29. Id. at 1232. Although racial implications were present, the court recognized
that the primary motivation was based on economic class considerations.
30. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
31. 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1970).
32. 383 U.S. at 762 (Clark, J., concurring) (emphasis added). See also id. at 774
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). However, one writer notes that
only two of the six Guest Justices who adhered to the quoted view remain on the Court
and that subsequent lower court cases treat the concurring opinions as dicta. Comment,
Civil Rights-Section 1985(3)-Civil Remedy Provided to Redress Interference with
First Amendment Right of Religious Freedom by Private Conspiracy-Action v.
Gannon, 47 N.Y.U.L. REv. 584, 587 n.25 (1972).
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second basis of the Eighth Circuit's finding of constitutional authority
was the intent of the legislature that passed the fourteenth amendment.8 3
After examining the legislative history, the Action court concurred with
the opinion that "'[a]ccording to the purpose and intention of the
Amendment as disclosed in the debates in Congress and in the several
state Legislatures and in other ways, Congress had the constitutional
power to enact direct legislation to secure the rights of citizens against
violation by individuals as well as by States.' ,4
Likewise, the Fifth Circuit in Westberry v. Gilman Paper Co."
held that a private conspiracy to deny an environmentalist and tax
reformer his first amendment right of freedom of speech was reached by
section 1985(3). Although this opinion has since been withdrawn 8--
the matter giving rise to the action being moot-and therefore has no
precedential value, the court's analysis reflects valid considerations. In
addition to the reasons given by the Action court, the Fifth Circuit
based its finding of section 5 congressional power on the fact that the
state action requirement has become so watered down 7 that many state
action cases are indistinguishable from private action cases. 88
Despite the recent varied judicial interpretations of section
1985(3), two aspects of the Fourth Circuit's holding in Bellamy v.
Mason's Stores, Inc. are unique. First, the court did not discuss, or
even recognize, the issue whether discrimination on the basis of mem-
bership in the Ku Klux Klan would satisfy Griffin's "otherwise class-
based, invidiously discriminatory animus." The court's failure to con-
33. 450 F.2d at 1236. See Frantz, Congressional Power to Enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment Against Private Acts, 73 YALE L.J. 1353 (1964). The author cites two
reasons to support his thesis that Congress does have the power to reach private acts
under section 5. First, the situation the fourteenth amendment was designed to remedy
required action against private wrongs. Id. at 1354. Second, "the framers wrote in light
of apparently settled constitutional doctrine that the mere recognition of a right in the
federal constitution gives Congress implied power to protect it" from private acts, and
thus section 5 was intended to broaden congressional power rather than limit it. Id. at
1357. But see Avins, The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871: Some Reflected Light on State
Action and the Fourteenth Amendment, 11 ST. Louis U.L.. 331 (1967).
34. 450 F.2d at 1237, quoting H. FLAcE, THE ADoPnON OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 277 (1909).
35. 507 F.2d 206 (5th Cir.), vacated, 507 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1975) (per curiam).
36. 507 F.2d at 216.
37. "A constitutional distinction cannot reasonably rest on the mere presense (sic]
or absence of a non-injuring state representative if we are to retain the amendment's
focus of protection of the victim." 507 F.2d at 214. For a brief summary of the
broadening of the "state action" requirement, see Note, Constitutional Law-Thirteenth
Amendment-Federal Civil Remedy Encompassing Private Conduct in Civil Rights
Violence, 46 TUL. L. REv. 822, 824-27 (1972).
38. 507F.2d at 211.
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sider this issue is inconsistent with section 1985(3) litigation since
Griffin, which has generally considered establishment of a class as a
threshold for the application of the statute.3 9
Additionally, although recent case law indicates that a major prob-
lem in applying section 1985(3) to private conspiracies is finding
constitutional authority for such action, the Bellamy court assumed that
constitutional authority existed.40  The Fourth Circiit's major concern
was determining whether Congesss intended section 1985(3) to protect
first amendment rights. One rationale the court gave for refusing to
apply section 1985(3) to first amendment rights concerned the fact that
the language of the statute parallels the language of section 1 of the
fourteenth amendment.41 The court relied on United States v. Guest
for the proposition that no equal protection clause rights exist against
purely private action. 2 However, the Supreme Court specifically recog-
nized in Griffin that although a century of fourteenth amendment
adjudication construing the equal protection clause makes "it under-
standably difficult to conceive of what might constitute a deprivation of
the equal protection of the laws by private persons,. . . there is nothing
inherent in the phrase that requires the action working the deprivation
to come from the State."43 In light of the facts that Griffin was decided
five years after Guest, and that Griffin dealt with section 1985(3) while
Guest dealt with that section's criminal counterpart, the Bellamy court's
reliance on Guest seems misplaced.
A second rationale is exhibited in the court's refusal to follow the
Eighth Circuit's reasoning in Action v. Gannon as to application of
section 1985(3) to first amendment rights.4 This refusal followed
from the Fourth Circuit's belief -that the Supreme Court must extend the
incorporation doctrine to private persons before the statute can be
construed to protect first amendment rights. Although the court found
39. See notes 26-27 and accompanying text supra.
40. See note 8 supra.
41. For the comparative language, see notes 1 & 7 supra.
42. 508 F.2d at 507. Actually, this statement was an allegation of the defense. 383
U.S. at 754. Since the Court found allegations of state action, Justice Stewart's
agreement with the allegation was not necessary to the Court's holding. However, six
Justices in concurring opinions suggest that they were not in agreement as to the
allegation. Nonetheless, many lower courts have treated the statemen't as part of the
holding. See note 32 supra.
43. 403 U.S. at 97.
44. The Fourth Circuit sums up Action's reasoning as going "from statutory
language tracking the fourteenth amendment to the amendment itself to incorporation of
the first amendment to application of that amendment to private persons, and jettisoning
state involvement." 508 F.2d at 507.
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the Action result appealing, it felt that the right of association was too
far removed from the language of section 1985(3) for Congress to have
intended its protection in that provision. However, again the court's
position seems inconsistent with Griffin. The court misconstrued Grif-
fin by confusing "source of constitutional authority" with "source of
rights deprived." This confusion is illustrated by the court's citation of
Griffin for the idea that section 1985(3) includes rights based upon the
thirteenth amendment.45 However, none of the rights allegedly denied
in Griffin was based on the thirteenth amendment; in fact, several,
including the right of freedom of association, were based on the first
amendment.46 Rather than being -the source of the deprived rights, the
thirteenth amendment was the source of constitutional authority for
applying the statute in Griffin, since the requisite animus was based on
race.
Although the Bellamy case was ideally suited for further definition
of the Griffin criteria, the Fourth Circuit failed to take advantage of the
opportunity. Based on the district court's finding that the Ku Klux
Klan is a political organization,47 indications are that membership in the
Ku Klux Klan would be considered a sufficient class for section
1985(3) purposes. The Supreme Court has held that interference with
the right of association for political groups also interferes with the right
to vote.48 In addition, discrimination on the basis of political associa-
tion indicates a purpose to deny that particular group equal participation
in the political process. The federal interest in protecting the right to
vote and other political rights justifies considering discrimination on the
basis of political association as satisfying the "otherwise class-based dis-
criminatory animus." 49
Indications are also good that the Supreme Court would uphold
section 5 power to reach private action. As the Action court noted,
although the Supreme Court left open the question of section 5 powers
in Griffin, the fourteenth amendment and section 1985(3) are too
closely related with respect to date of passage, authorship, and purpose
to permit the Supreme Court to deny section 5 power to reach private
action with consistency.50 The similarity in language between section
45. Id. at 506.
46. 403 U.S. at 101.
47. 368 F. Supp. at 1028.
48. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968).
49. Note, Federal Remedy to Redress Private Deprivations of Civil Rights, 85
HARv. L. R V. 95, 100 (1971).
50. 450 F.2d at 1236.
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1985(3) and section 1 of the fourteenth amendment must be of some
significance and gives credence to the argument that Congress intended
section 1985(3) to protect fourteenth-amendment-based rights against
private interference.
Besides the court's failure to deal with the scope of Griffin's
criteria, the Bellamy decision has other shortcomings. The Fourth
Circuit virtually ignored the Griffin framework of section 1985(3)
interpretation, while relying on older and less relevant cases. The court
did not consider whether the requisite class discrimination was satisfied.
Nor was Griffin's policy of giving civil rights statutes a broad interpreta-
tion considered or followed. Finally, the minimum consideration given
Griffin was based on a misinterpretation of the Supreme Courts holding
in that case. Although section 1985(3) has made great strides since
1971 towards becoming a vital civil rights statute, the Bellamy decision
indicates that, at least until the Supreme Court clearly defines the scope
of the statute, application of section 1985(3) will be greatly restricted.
SUSAN C. MALPASS
Constitutional Law-State Action-Golden v. Biscayne Bay
Yacht Club: Preventing Discrimination by Private Clubs
Using the bay bottom off Miami as a vantage point, the Fifth
Circuit has launched a state action torpedo to sink the membership
practices of a private yacht club. Although the Supreme Court has
refrained from answering whether the membership policies of private
clubs can be attacked on state action grounds,' the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit found the question squarely presented to it in Golden v.
Biscayne Bay Yacht Club2 and answered the question in the affirmative.
In Golden the court held that leasing publicly owned bay bottom land to
a yacht club for its docks constituted sufficient state involvement to
unleash a fourteenth amendment attack on racial and religious discrimi-
nation in the club's membership practices.3
1. In Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 166-68 (1972), the Supreme
Court refused on standing grounds to hear an attack on allegedly discriminatory
membership practices of a private social club.
2. 521 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1975).
3. Id. at 352 (alternative holding).
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